WC148 MayJune 2026 - Magazine - Page 15
Act, in contrast, absolves all parties of accountability. The Act
provides broad immunity from liability and personal liability
protection to the province, municipalities, and corporation
directors. While this may be intended to reduce risk aversion in
decision-making, its practical effect is a significant weakening of
accountability mechanisms. The Canadian Environmental Law
Association called out this lack of accountability, noting that it
runs counter to Walkerton-era legislative reforms that enshrined
a ‘duty of care’ requiring each municipal council to be directly
accountable for the safety of its water system. Under such rules,
it is reasonable to ask how public trust will be sustained.
Guardrail 3: Oversight
“Council lacked the visibility and expert support to provide effective
oversight.”— Bearspaw South Feedermain Independent Review
Panel: Final Report (page 7)
The Panel concluded that Calgary City Council was not
well positioned to fulfill its oversight responsibilities due to a
lack of regular staff updates and a lack of access to independent
technical expertise.
It recommends forming a service corporation with a professional board of directors to oversee its operations. In the
short term, before the service corporation is created, the Panel
recommends establishing an Expert Water Utility Oversight
Board. This board will ensure that Council, which is directly
responsible for overseeing the complex, city-wide water system
has access to engineering, scientific, and environmental knowledge and expertise. The creation of an expert advisory board is
an important measure that other municipal water departments
should consider.
There is another critical level of oversight needed: provincial
oversight. Strengthening provincial oversight was a cornerstone
of the 2003 Walkerton Inquiry recommendations, which led
to a comprehensive multi-barrier approach to drinking water
safety. This included provincial requirements for each water
department to complete financial plans and asset management
plans, secure new licences to operate, and implement source
water protection plans, among other reforms. A Chief Drinking
Water Inspector, a dedicated division on drinking water within
the Ontario Ministry of the Environment, and an external
Advisory Council on Drinking Water Quality and Testing Standards were created to complete this comprehensive provincial
oversight regime.
It remains to be seen whether these post-Walkerton-era
provincial oversight requirements will remain in place as the
Water and Wastewater Public Corporations Act is implemented.
That is because it remains unclear whether new water and
wastewater corporations created under the Act will be privately
or publicly owned, and who they will ultimately answer to.
Existing legislative and regulatory frameworks were designed to
regulate municipally-owned entities, whether separate service
WAT E R C A N A D A . N E T
corporations or municipal departments. Effective oversight
could therefore require substantial revisions to current provincial
laws and regulations.
Conclusion: Guardrails first
Effective governance of drinking water service delivery can
be achieved through a range of governance models, including
service corporations and municipal departments. What matters
most is that these models are underpinned by strong guardrails:
direct responsibility, robust accountability of all parties, and
effective provincial oversight.
There is a risk in assuming that the creation of service corporations is, on its own, a solution. Strong guardrails will guarantee the effective and safe management of the utility. Without
strong guardrails, governance reform may simply recreate the
conditions for future failure.
After all, the Town of Walkerton had full confidence in its
public utility corporation over the May 24 weekend in 2000.
Seven people died, and 2,300 became seriously ill. Structure
alone did not protect them. This is why guardrails matter.
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